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The 2009 European Election in Italy:
National or European?
FABIO SERRICCHIO
Departments of Economia, Gestione, Società e Istituzioni, University of Molise, Isernia, Italy
ABSTRACT In June 2009, European citizens voted in the European Parliamentary elections.
Despite the relevance of the election, turnout across countries was particularly low. In Italy, too,
abstention is growing and this paper aims to explain why. Traditionally, low turnout in European
Parliamentary elections is explained by the fact that they are considered second-order elections
and, thus, less important than national elections. According to this perspective, national factors
are the main cause of lower turnout as compared to national elections. Thus, it is generally
considered that low turnout is not related to citizens’ support for the European Union or other
European attitudes, such as European identity. In this article, this perspective is questioned and
other individual factors are considered. In particular, a number of European attitudes are
considered as independent variables together with national factors. The findings show that
abstention in European Parliamentary elections in Italy is directly linked to citizens’ disaffection
with politics, rather than disaffection with government performance. Furthermore, attitudes
toward the European Union integration project play a role only when the level of political
involvement is high. Thus, European questions matter and turnout in European Parliamentary
elections is driven not only by national-level factors, but also by citizens’ satisfaction with the
European Union and sense of European identity.
KEY WORDS: European vote, European attitudes, political involvement, turnout, Italy
Introduction1
In 2014, European citizens will vote in the eighth European Parliamentary elections. There
are certain expectations concerning these elections as they will take place at a particularly
delicate time for the European Union (EU) due to the economic and financial crisis in
Europe, which calls into question the very existence of a united Europe. Voting is also a
key behavioural indicator of EU engagement and, thus, interest is especially strong. The
last elections were held in June 2009 and, despite their importance, the average partici-
pation rate in European countries was particularly low: 43% for the 27 EU member-
states (EU-27). In Italy, for a long time an example of high turnout, scrutiny of the rate
of turnout reveals a rather sharp decline, down by 7% compared to the 2004 elections
and by 20% compared to the first European Parliamentary elections held in 1979.
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Various considerations lead to the hypothesis that the fall in turnout observed in Italy in
the 2009 European elections was not entirely due to physiological reasons and cannot be
explained only by the fact that they are second-order elections. Nor should the decline
be explained only in terms of the natural declining trend that characterizes the participation
rates in national elections in Italy.
The decline in the participation rate in the 2009 European elections in Italy was higher
than in other European countries. In addition, the difference in the abstention rate between
the national and European elections is growing – that is to say that abstention in the Euro-
pean elections is increasing to a greater extent than in national elections. Finally, the decline
in voting seems to be closely associated with a decrease in indicators of Italian
Europeanism.
Although the literature assigns European elections the status of second-order elections,
there are reasonable justifications for assuming that the decline in voter turnout in the Euro-
pean elections is due to several reasons and that it reflects an increasing level of Euroscepti-
cism. Using Eurobarometer data with individual level analysis, this paper aims to examine
voter turnout and the relationship between European attitudes (in particular, European iden-
tity and support for the European integration project) and European Parliamentary elections
in Italy.
The 2009 European Parliamentary Elections: Europe and Italy
The European Parliamentary elections, held in June 2009, were particularly important
because they took place at a very critical time for the EU. Although the Lisbon Treaty intro-
duced only a few innovations in the institutional architecture of the EU, it undeniably
helped to increase the accountability of the system, linking the results of the elections
and the appointment of the President of the European Commission. Yet, Europeans do
not seem to have perceived the real importance of the elections: European participation
was, on average, very low. The turnout in Europe was 43% (in other words, almost six
out of 10 Europeans did not vote in the polls). Participation rates were especially low in
Lithuania and Slovakia (around 20%), slightly higher for Poland (25%) and, in contrast,
more than 90% in nations such as Belgium and Luxembourg, which always have a high
turnout. Figure 1 shows the distribution of voter turnout among countries in the European
elections in June 2009. At the bottom of the list, with very low participation rates are the
Eastern European countries as well as the most recent EU member-states. However, absten-
tion also affects countries with the oldest membership in the community, such as Germany
and France.
The very low average European turnout rate is due primarily to recent accession
countries, as can be seen quite clearly in Figure 2, whereas the citizens of the most estab-
lished European nations show higher rates, with the exception of Germany and France as
already indicated. At first glance, it seems indubitable that the European elections are per-
ceived as second-order, or less important, elections and that this was even more the case in
2009. This is borne out by the fact that the average participation in national elections among
the 27 EU countries is much higher, standing at 70%.2
Turning specifically to the Italian voters’ behaviour in the 2009 European elections, the
participation rate was 65%, one of the highest percentages among the European countries
and considerably above the average (the reference being the EU-27), but also significantly
higher than the average turnout of the founding countries of Europe (just above 61%, as
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Figure 1. European election: Turnout among European countries (%)
Source: European Parliament.
Figure 2. Turnout in European Parliament election (2009) according to length of European
membership (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on European Parliament data.
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shown in Figure 2). In other words, Italians still participate in the European elections by a
large majority, but this is only true when considered from a synchronic perspective, i.e. if
the benchmark is the participation rate in other nations. If the comparison is made over time
in the same country, the overall picture changes considerably.
In greater detail, as summarized in Figure 3,3 there was a decrease of almost 20 percen-
tage points between the participation rate in the first European Parliamentary elections in
1979 and that in the 2009 elections. To propose some terms of comparison, the partici-
pation rate in Belgium is stable over time (91% participation in 1979 and 90% in 2009,
although this trend is to be expected because, in Belgium, voting is compulsory); in the
United Kingdom, participation is even growing, albeit slightly (32% in 1979 and 35% in
2009).
If one examines the data on participation in voting for the national Parliamentary elec-
tions – for many years emblematic of very high participation – a slight decline is also
observed, but it is generalized (the reasons are beyond the scope of this paper, but see Stein-
brecher & Rattinger, 2012a). Thus, participation in national elections in Italy is also declin-
ing, but this is still considered physiological, similar to other Western democracies: the
average attendance was close to 90% (this value takes into account all the elections for
the Chamber of Deputies for the period 1948–2008 and changes slightly if the 2013
national elections are included, in which turnout was 75.15%), but over time, this has
decreased by almost 12 percentage points (more than 17%, if we include 2013). A brief
comparison of turnout in Italy at the European and national levels across time reveals
how the difference is growing: in 1979, the difference between the two elections was
only 5 percentage points in favour of the national elections, in 1994, the gap had risen
Figure 3. European election turnout across time in selected countries (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on European Parliament data.
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to 13%, and the gap between the 2008 national elections and the 2009 European elections
was 15%, as shown in Figure 4.
In other words, in Italy, voter turnout is decreasing both in national and European elec-
tions, but the abstention rate in European elections is more accentuated. Such consider-
ations inspired the first comments on the European elections in Italy, made by
researchers at the Istituto Cattaneo (Bellucci, Garzia & Rubal Maseda, 2010; Natale,
2010). With some caution, it can be assumed that the growing abstention in the European
elections is an indicator of increasing scepticism on the part of Italians towards Europe,
which is the object of study of other research (e.g. Serricchio, 2011).
But is this really the case? Are the two phenomena actually linked? Are the growth in
Euroscepticism in general and the decrease in the levels of support for and identification
with Europe really among the possible causes of this alienation regarding European Parlia-
mentary elections in Italy? Certainly, Italians are now more distant from Europe than in the
past: using the membership indicator, the trend of European support is clearly in decline in
Italy, as Figure 5 shows.
Studies have assessed the role of cultural (also termed ‘ascribed’) national identity (e.g.
Serricchio, 2010) and the impact of the economic and financial crisis (e.g. Serricchio, Tsa-
katika & Quaglia, 2013) on the growth of Euroscepticism and these elements could also
influence vote behaviour.
The factors considered thus far give only partial explanations and the question of what
affects turnout is actually far more complex. Voter turnout in the 2009 European Parlia-
mentary elections in Italy is not distributed homogeneously: in Sardinia, only 41%
voted, whereas in Umbria, the rate was 78%; generally, in the southern regions, fewer citi-
zens voted than in the ‘red’ regions and in the north and centre). Thus, the decrease in
turnout in the European Parliamentary elections in Italy can partially be explained by the
increase in disaffection in the southern regions, but the differences between the several
Figure 4. Differences among turnout in national and European elections (Italy, %)
Source: Author’s calculation based on official data (EU Parliament and Italian Minister of Interior).
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geographical areas of Italy may reflect other attitudes and orientations, related to several
factors. Thus, I argue that the interpretation of voting behaviour in the European elections
needs to consider explanations that differ from those traditionally adopted.
Who Voted in Italy?
The previous section presented the distribution of voting patterns among the European
nations in 2009, the trend over time of participation in the European elections in Italy
(and in some selected cases), pointing also to the geographic variations within Italy. As
the main goal of this paper is not to explain increasing abstention over time, but the
causes of abstention in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections in Italy, the question
is: who voted in Italy? An examination of voting behaviour in relation to socio-demo-
graphic profiles may not prove decisive in understanding the causes of abstention, but
the data collected in the Eurobarometer 71.3, conducted in 2009 a few days after the Euro-
pean elections, allow us to draw a raw map of the voters.4
Women and men voted in a substantially similar way, while turnout increased in the
intermediate categories of age, being lower among the younger and older voters. The dis-
tribution of voting according to educational level is as expected (the more educated tend to
vote more); the picture is similar for profession, with more managers voting and, conver-
sely, the unemployed tending not to vote. Ultimately, the distribution of voting according
to socio-demographic variables seems to confirm the initial impression: the citizens belong-
ing to social groups that are more ‘central’ (better educated and wealthier) tend to vote
Figure 5. The evolution of support for European integration in Italy (1992–2009)
Source: Eurobarometer (various). % of citizens answering Italy’s EU membership is a good thing
(missing excluded).
6 F. Serricchio
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
09
.11
6.1
57
.24
7]
 at
 11
:45
 28
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
14
 
more. However, in general, the differences in turnout based on socio-demographic vari-
ables do not appear high, so the main conclusion is that socio-demographic characteristics
do not exert a decisive impact on the decision to vote or abstain.
In contrast, the picture that emerges from an examination of the distribution of voting
patterns according to selected economic variables is more interesting. The perception of
the national economic situation influences the decision to vote in European elections:
the turnout level was 37.7% for those who considered that the national economy had wor-
sened, as opposed to 61.1% for those who judged it more favourably.
Analysing the distribution of voters according to socio-political variables gives a more
articulate picture. As expected, people who are interested in politics tend to vote more than
those who are not (64.5% vs. 41%). In this, political parties seem to play a decisive role, as
the percentage of voters tends to rise considerably from those who are distant from political
parties (20.7%) to those who declare themselves close (68.8%). Trust in the national gov-
ernment also exerts quite a strong effect (low trust 44% vs. high trust 58.2%), and those
who vote in national elections also tend to vote in the European elections (57.9%, as
opposed to 27.9% for those who did not vote in the national elections).
This kind of analysis, although rather simple, provides the first indications of the poss-
ible reasons for abstention. However, before we delve further into searching for the causes,
it could be useful to consider what citizens said had directly motivated abstention when
answering questions included in the Eurobarometer 71.3 (Papacostas, 2009). For Italian
citizens (considering only those who stated that they had abstained), the main reason for
abstention in the 2009 European elections was lack of trust and disaffection with politics
in general (31.2%, EU average 28%). Among the reasons for not voting, Italians claim
to be influenced by a feeling of helplessness, the perception that their votes are useless
and that voting will not change the situation, in other words what the political scientists
define as a sense of personal inefficacy (16.3%, EU average 17%). Again, they cite lack
of interest in politics in general (9.5%, EU average 17%). Also, among the Italians who
abstained, 8% indicated their lack of knowledge of European issues as the reason (EU
average 10%), and only 5% justified their abstention by lack of interest in European
issues (EU average 9%) and lack of trust in the European Parliament (EU average 8%).
The results are summarized in Table 1.
In short, from a first evaluation, conducted through monovariate analysis, Italians’ elec-
toral behaviour in relation to Europe seems to be driven by political factors, comprising
general mechanisms of various kinds that are activated in the national context, rather
than by purely European motivations.
What Drives Italian Voters’ Behaviour in European Elections?
In order to assess the predictors of voting in European elections, in the next sections, I
present and discuss the literature that explains voting behaviour, in particular abstention.
I then introduce the operationalization of the theories and the variable employed in the
study.
The explanation of voting behaviour is a particularly fruitful research tradition. Purely an
individual choice, voting is primarily explained by two types of factors: 1) long-term, such
as party identification, the voter’s social position, values, and the context in which the voter
lives; 2) short-term, such as the individual’s view of the government in power, the image of
The 2009 European Election in Italy: National or European? 7
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the leader, the issues raised during the election campaign, and the impact of the campaign
(Bellucci & Segatti, 2010b).
More precisely, voting behaviour is explained by traditional (or ascribed) factors, which
may exert an effect even moments away from the election campaign, and acquired factors,
which primarily relate to the immediacy of the vote itself. According to a more sophisti-
cated point of view, ascribed factors can also be labelled as the antecedents of voting
choices (Biorcio, 2010). Abstention, traditionally explained in Italy only by a lack of
civic culture, can be traced to social factors or may derive from rational choices, which
are substantiated in a judgement delivered by the voter (Tuorto, 2010).
These models have been applied successfully to the study of the electoral behaviour of
Italian citizens in the national elections, i.e. first-order elections. To what extent are they
applicable and valid explanations of voting behaviour in European elections? In the litera-
ture, there is general agreement that the explanation of European voting behaviour does not
strictly follow the traditional interpretations of electoral behaviour because such elections
are sui generis: the largely dominant explanation is based on the consideration that Euro-
pean elections are second-order (Marsh, 1998; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2007).
According to this perspective, European elections are dominated by issues rooted in the
national context and can also be seen as a mid-term election test, similar to the US mid-
term elections, in which the incumbent government measures its appeal. The idea that
the European elections concern and are decided by European topics and that citizens
vote first on their opinion about Europe is quite remote (Bellucci, Garzia & Rubal
Maseda, 2010; Hix & Marsh, 2007; Natale, 2010; for a slightly different point of view,
see Mattila, 2003).
The second-order election model has been employed widely in aggregate level analysis.
However, the aforementioned perspectives can also contribute to the operationalization of
Table 1. What are the main reasons you did NOT vote in the recent European Parliamentary
elections? (Italy vs. EU-27)
% %
Italy EU-27
Opposed to the European Union 1 4
Rarely or never vote 2 10
Lack of public debate/ lack of electoral campaign 3 6
Not interested in European matters 5 9
Not really satisfied with the European Parliament as an institution 5 8
Involved in a family/ leisure activity 6 5
Too busy/ no time/ had to work 6 10
Sick/ health problem 8 7
Do not know much about the European Union/ European Parliament or the European
Parliament elections
8 10
Not interested in politics 10 17
On holiday/ away from home 13 10
Other 14 6
Vote has no consequences/vote does not change anything 16 17
Lack of trust in/ dissatisfaction with politics generally 31 28
N 353 10.796
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurobarometer 71.3, 2009. Multiple answers possible.
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explanatory models at the individual level. Based on this, I examine the factors that predict
voting behaviour in European elections in Italy.
The main idea of the second-order election model, originally developed in relation to
the first elections for the European Parliament in 1979, is that citizens’ choice reflects,
more or less, an opinion concerning national political actors and their behaviour in the
national arena. Because information on and knowledge of European issues are scarce,
citizens tend to use domestic factors as proxies. One of the key factors in the
second-order model is voting in previous national elections. The mid-term election
model shares with the second-order model the notion that domestic dynamics drive
the choices of voters. Unlike the second-order model, however, the mid-term model
emphasizes the role of the government and its performance: the European elections,
depending on their timing in relation to the national election cycle and the proximity/
distance from the national elections (which, of course, varies from case to case), can
assume the role of a real test for the incumbent government, similar to the US mid-
term elections.
With regard to Italy, the European elections took place one year after the national elec-
tions and, thus, the possible interpretation of the European elections playing a mid-term
role is problematic: generally, at that stage, the government is still enjoying a honeymoon
period with the voters (Bellucci, 2006) and consensus is, at least theoretically, still quite
high. The trend in levels of popularity, in fact, typically follows a U-shaped pattern,
high initially during the election campaign and in the aforementioned honeymoon phase,
then settling at lower levels during the period of government itself, in which decisions
and the implementation of policies divide public opinion (the so-called ‘cost of ruling’).
In the specific case of Italy, even though the severe economic crisis had a negative
impact on consensus concerning the government in power, the levels recorded in June
2009 were still quite high.
Although national factors, both in relation to the second-order model and the mid-term
variant, explain much of the voting behaviour in the European elections, alternative expla-
nations cannot be ignored. From Downs (1957) and the following literature on the ‘paradox
of voting’, we know that a major element that might explain rational decisions in voting is
the expected benefits of voting. One of the expected benefits could derive from European
governance performance, in a broad sense. According to this point of view, voting choice is
centred on individual feelings toward Europe. Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson (1997)
advanced a similar hypothesis, showing – with analysis at the individual level – that citi-
zens who were more favourable to the European integration process were more likely to
vote in the European elections. Subsequent to the institution of the European Parliament
and the formation of the European Commission, Schmitt (2007), drawing directly on
voting results, showed that voters’ perceptions of the personal effectiveness of their
votes was increased and this had a positive effect on voting behaviour; European attitudes
are also key variables in Bellucci’s arguments (Bellucci et al., 2010). From this perspective,
individual orientation towards European institutions and the perception of benefits from
European membership and support for Europe play a key role in European voting
behaviour.
The hypothesis that European issues play an important role in the voters’ choice, there-
fore, makes sense: 2009 was a crucial year for the EU as a few months later, the Lisbon
Treaty would be implemented. Although the new Treaty did not change the essence of
the institutional architecture of the EU or the heart of the decision-making process, by
The 2009 European Election in Italy: National or European? 9
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establishing a more direct relationship between the result of the elections and the formation
of the European Commission, it affected the sense of efficacy of individual voting.
In this discussion, we can see the absence of a relevant factor, namely European identity.
What is its role in determining voting behaviour? Other studies (e.g. Serricchio, 2011) have
attempted to identity the role of predictor in European voting: identification with a political
system is a crucial feature in terms of legitimacy. Thus, among the possible causes of Euro-
pean voting behaviour, European identity should be considered, together with the image of
Europe (Diez Medrano, 2003).
As stated, voting behaviour could also be predicted by long-term factors. According to
the Michigan socio-psychological approach, attachment to a party promotes involvement in
the political process (Campbell et al., 1960), while cognitive mobilization theory (Ingle-
hart, 1970; Janssen, 1991) predicts that citizens who are more interested in politics are
more likely to vote in general and also in the European elections (for a discussion of the
role of cognitive mobilization variables in explaining European voting, see also Steinbre-
cher & Rattinger, 2012b). National institutions also play a role in the political mobilization
process: the level of confidence in national institutions is a form of proxy for political pos-
ition overall when supranational governance is implied, as Anderson (1998) and Sanchez-
Cuenca (2000) claim, showing its role in shaping citizens’ attitudes and behaviour toward
Europe. Parties are also key actors in shaping voter preferences as extremist parties on both
the right and the left reveal higher levels of Euroscepticism, while mainstream parties tend
to be more favourable to European integration (Conti, 2009; Taggart, 1998). Thus, left-
right ideology could also aid us in explaining European voting behaviour.
To sum up, voting behaviour – and abstention – can be explained by national and Euro-
pean factors that coexist in citizens’ minds and influence their choice. The national factors
concern civic duty and the evaluation of government performance. The European factors
are strictly related to the image and the performance of supranational governance. Both
national and European factors could be viewed as short-term factors; long-term factors
are those related to political mobilization and political ideology. In terms of political
support, there is a difference between institutional trust or confidence and political invol-
vement (Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999); thus, I treat political involvement and national insti-
tutional trust as being comprised of two separate groups of variables.5 Based on these
considerations, I seek to operationalize the aforementioned perspectives.
Operationalization and Hypotheses
Given the available indicators in the dataset employed in this study, I include five variables
relating to national factors: voting in the previous national election, evaluation of the
national economy, personal job evaluation, household financial valuation, and the judge-
ment of national employment policies. The logic is quite intuitive: voting in the previous
national election concerns a sense of civic duty, so those who have voted previously are
more likely to vote again in a different election because of their civic commitment; this
assumption is the basis of the second-order model, as displayed by Reif and Schmitt
(1980). Economic evaluation, general and personal, is an indirect judgement about
government. The expected sign is negative in all cases as those who support the national
government (also because the economy is performing strongly) in the logic of a mid-
term election are more likely to vote in an election, viewing it as a referendum about
that government. Conversely, the more dissatisfied tend to abstain (Bellucci et al., 2010;
10 F. Serricchio
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Reif, 1984; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). Thus, the expected impact on abstention in the
2009 European elections is negative for all the variables and clearly also for the constructed
index. I introduce and employ indices constructed through factor analysis, rather than
single variables, because multivariate models are more parsimonious and the tables are
more readable. In this case, the national vote is conceptually and empirically separated
from the evaluation of the government’s performance.
The European factors include a set of variables that aim to tap several individual attitudes
toward European governance: image of Europe and European identity reflect affective
orientations toward Europe (Niedermayer & Westle, 1995); European support, measured
as favouring European membership and perceived benefits from EU membership; Euro-
pean attitudes, including trust towards the EU as a whole and trust towards its institutions;
support for European policy-making and the view that members of the European Parlia-
ment are important. The logic is clear: citizens who view the integration project positively
in relation to its various aspects are likely to be more in favour of going to the polls for the
European Parliament (Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson, 1997). Based on factor analysis, these
variables are combined in a single scale.
The political mobilization perspective is operationalized by interest in politics, strength
of party identification and confidence in several national institutions, such as justice,
parties, government and parliament. As already discussed, political involvement is concep-
tually independent from institutional trust and this assumption has been empirically con-
firmed; consequently, this perspective is operationalized by two derivate scales. The
expected direction of association is negative for all mentioned variables because a high
level of political involvement and confidence in national institutions should reduce
abstention.
Finally, I include the role of political ideology as a predictor of European abstention:
according to the literature discussed, mainstream (also labelled ‘centrist’) parties are
more favourable to the European integration project and, thus, citizens positioned at the
centre of the political spectrum may tend to vote more in European elections. Thus, in
the model, I include a variable that taps centrism as a political ideology.
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical model, the operationalization of the concepts and the
hypotheses.
Predictors of European Voting in Italy: The Empirical Analysis
As the main goal of this paper is to explain the reasons for abstention, in the following
multivariate analysis, the dependent variable is voting in the 2009 European elections
and is coded as a binary variable with two options: 0 (voted) and 1 (did not vote or
abstained). The independent variables are those related to the theoretical perspectives dis-
cussed above.6 In order to obtain an answer to the main research question about the factors
that could explain abstention in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections in Italy, I run a
logistic regression model with two groups of variables: national and European factors; a set
of socio-demographic variables is also included as a control in the equations. In Model 1,
presented in Table 3, the predictors are the national and the European scales (together with
the control variables) and the results, presented as odds ratios (OR), are quite clear:7 the
main (negative) effect on abstention is exerted by voting in previous national elections,
as expected (OR = 0.33). National and European factors have more or less the same
weight, so they contribute equally to the explanation of abstention in the European
The 2009 European Election in Italy: National or European? 11
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Table 2. The dependent and independent variables
Dependent variable Expected impact on DV
Abstainers at 2009 European election
Independent variables
National factors (second-order and mid-term models)
Vote previous national elections
National economy evaluation
+/−
Personal job evaluation
Household finance evaluation
National employment evaluation
European factors
-
European support
Benefit from EU membership
European institutional trust
Support for European policy-making
Image of Europe
European identity
Members of EP are important
Political involvement
Strength of party identification, interest in politics -
National institutional trust -
Trust in: justice, parties, government, parliament -
Political ideology -
Notes: The signs indicate the expected direction of association of the predictors on dependent variables.
Table 3A. The individual predictors of European votes in Italy (2009)
Logistic regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Vote national election .33*** .32*** .38***
Support national policy making .92** .93*** .97***
European factors .89*** .92** .96
Political ideology .42*** .37***
Political involvement .63***
National institutional trust .98
Socio-dem. vars (control)
Education .89*** .90*** .89***
Urban residence 1.38* 1.34 1.30
Sex 1.10 1.07 1.14
Age .99** .99** .98**
Social status 1.12* 1.10* 1.07
Pseudo R quadro (Negelkerke) .14 .18 .31
Chi-quadro (sig.) .000 .000 .000
N 920 920 801
Notes: Author’s calculation based on EB 71.3, 2009.
Dependent variable: abstainer at European election (voted yes/no).
Entries are odds ratio and level of significance.
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.
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elections. The OR is 0.91 for the national scale and –.89 for the European scale and both
variables are statistically significant. The overall model has limited explanatory power as
the low level of the pseudo r-square reveals (0.14). Nonetheless, in 2009, those who
abstained clearly had in mind both national factors, such as civic duty and the judgement
on government performance (the sign is negative, confirming the hypothesis), and Euro-
pean factors, such as political support, European identity, support for policy-making,
trust in European institutions, and so on.
However, what about political mobilization and political ideology? In Model 2, political
ideology was entered in the model and contributes in a very positive way to explaining
European abstention. Its weight is quite strong with a negative direction, as expected
(0.42). National and European factors keep their role, as in the previous equation, but
the overall model significantly increases its explanatory power: the pseudo r-square is
enhanced to 0.18 (still significant). In the subsequent step (Model 3), political mobilization
was also entered in the model and the results are quite surprising: only voting in previous
national elections and political ideology keep their weights (and statistical significance),
but neither national nor the European scales are now statistically significant and their
weights are halved. Hence, through the interaction with political mobilization, the roles
of European and national factors simply vanish. The most powerful explanatory factor
becomes political ideology (OR = 0.37) and the weight of the political mobilization
scale (0.63) is quite strong. However, the overall model has better explanatory power
than the previous model, as indicated by the pseudo r-square of 0.31.
Thus, this is the better model, but that does not explain why European and national
factors disappear when political involvement is entered into the equation. As discussed,
while European and national considerations are short-term factors, political mobilization
Table 3B. The role of political mobilization as predictors of European votes in Italy (2009)
Logistic regression
Low Pol. Mob. High Pol. Mob.
Model 4 Model 5
Vote national election .33*** .31**
Support national policy making .98 .85*
European factors .97 .85*
Political ideology .40*** .30***
National institutional trust .93 1.12
Socio-dem. vars (control)
Education .86*** .96
Urban residence 1.15 1.65
Sex 1.01 1.09
Age .98** .98*
Social status 1.06 1.08
Pseudo R quadro (Negelkerke) .17 .23
Chi-quadro (sig.) .000 .000
N 531 270
Notes: Author’s calculation based on EB 71.3, 2009.
Dependent variable: abstainer at European election (voted yes/no).
Entries are odds ratio and level of significance.
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.
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and political ideology are long-term factors and, thus, are probably antecedents not only of
voting, but also of short-term factors.
At this stage, the goal is to assess the possible interactions among variables and, in order
to do so, I run two separate regression models, one for citizens who declare a low level of
political involvement and another for individuals who proclaim a high level of engagement
in politics. The results, summarized in Table 3, are quite interesting. There are only a few
relevant differences between Model 4 (the regression model on Italians with a low level of
political involvement) and Model 5 (the citizens with a high level of political engagement).
One is the role played by European factors, which are weak and not significant in Model 4,
but are stronger and – more importantly – statistically significant in Model 5. Also, the
evaluation of the national government changes its impact and becomes significant. The
other factors (voting in previous elections and political ideology) do not differ clearly
between the two models. Thus, when political involvement intervenes in the relation,
neither European nor national factors are significant, but when the level of political mobil-
ization is higher, they become significant and their weights increase in the explanation of
abstention in the 2009 European elections. Finally, the overall model is more robust in the
case of high political involvement, as shown by the pseudo r-square values (0.23 vs. 0.14).
To sum up, the 2009 European Parliamentary elections in Italy were mainly decided on
the basis of national issues. These are not entirely related to the electoral campaign or to
domestic political dynamics, or indeed to the performance of the incumbent government
or other institutions, but rather to the structural dynamics that define the national political
debate. Italians were influenced in their decision whether or not to vote for the renewal of
the European Parliament in June 2009 primarily by their proximity to politics and the
ability (or inability) of political parties and other political actors to mobilize them, rather
than by the will to reward or punish the incumbent government. The level of political invol-
vement plays a key role: among citizens less involved in politics, voting in previous elec-
tions and political ideology are more relevant; among citizens who are more involved in
political affairs, closeness to political parties and interest in politics – short-term factors,
including European issues – become more relevant. With regard to this, European
factors explain abstention only among those who are more involved in politics, whereas
for those who are less engaged, the 2009 European elections were purely second order.
Conclusions
In this article, I have endeavoured to explain the reasons for abstention in the 2009 Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections in Italy. Assuming a synchronic perspective and taking note
that participation in European elections is falling throughout Western Europe, I sought the
reasons. Traditionally, the European elections have been considered second-order or com-
parable to the US mid-term elections, but little consideration has been given to European
factors. My view is that in the choice of voting for the renewal of the European Parliament,
next to national issues, European issues gain increasing importance and can help to explain
the declining turnout. I consider that the results are quite interesting, but confirm only
partially my main hypothesis.
The European elections, in Italy as in the rest of Europe, are still second order in the
sense that they are dominated by domestic issues and this means that short-term factors,
such as endorsement of the government and European support, have a limited impact on
voting behaviour, the only exception being a sense of civic duty, as expected. Traditional
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predictors of voting behaviour – long-term factors – such as party identification or interest
in politics do indeed have a stronger impact; more precisely, the level of political involve-
ment plays a key part and its conditioning role is evident looking at the different impact of
variables among people with low and high levels of political involvement. Among those in
the latter group, short-term factors also become relevant in explaining voting behaviour.
This is quite an interesting finding because, in Italy, national voting behaviour has long
been considered only in relation to long-term factors and contextual variables (ecological
analysis) and has only recently begun to be explored increasingly in relation to short-term
factors, as research by the Itanes group shows. Furthermore, European elections have
always tended to be considered only as second order, with no qualification. In contrast,
this paper proposes a third way of exploring the voting phenomenon.
Whether the trends observed in this paper reflect a structured orientation or other motiv-
ations that are rather more immediate and contingent is a matter for academic debate. For
instance, it could be useful to extend this type of analysis to other European elections in
Italy and other national contexts. In the meantime, the next European elections will
yield some (maybe raw) answers.
Notes
1 A preliminary version of this paper was delivered at the XXV SISP (Italian Society for Political Science) Annual
Congress, 8–10 September 2011, University of Palermo.
2 The comparison is made with the last national Parliamentary elections.
3 Turnout rates in European elections in all European countries across time are presented in Table 4 (see
Appendix).
4 The results using the European Election Study are more or less the same.
5 This structure has been empirically confirmed through exploratory factor analysis. More details on the reliability
of the derived scales are in the Appendix (Table 5).
6 The descriptions of the variables and the coding procedure are in Table 5 (see Appendix).
7 I prefer to show the odds ratio for a more direct comprehension of the results.
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APPENDIX
Table 4. Turnout in European elections in European country across time
1979 1981 1984 1987 1989 1994 1995 1996 1999 2004 2007 2009
Belgium 91.4 92.1 90.7 90.7 91.1 90.8 90.4
Denmark 47.8 52.4 46.2 52.9 50.5 47.9 59.5
Germany 65.7 56.8 62.3 60.0 45.2 43.0 43.3
Ireland 63.6 47.6 68.3 44.0 50.2 58.6 58.6
France 60.7 56.7 48.8 52.7 46.8 42.8 40.6
Italy 85.7 82.5 81.1 73.6 69.8 71.7 65.1
Luxembourg 88.9 88.8 87.4 88.6 87.3 91.4 90.8
The Netherlands 58.1 50.9 47.5 35.7 30.0 39.3 36.8
United Kingdom 32.4 32.6 36.4 36.4 24.0 38.5 34.7
Greece 81.5 80.6 80.0 73.2 70.3 63.2 52.6
Spain 68.5 54.7 59.1 63.1 45.1 44.9
Portugal 72.4 51.1 35.5 39.9 38.6 36.8
Sweden 41.6 38.8 37.9 45.5
Austria 67.7 49.4 42.4 46.0
Finland 57.6 30.1 39.4 40.3
Czech Rep. 28.3 28.2
Estonia 26.8 43.9
Cyprus 72.5 59.4
Lithuania 48.4 21.0
Latvia 41.3 53.7
Hungary 38.5 36.3
Malta 82.4 78.8
Poland 20.9 24.5
Slovenia 28.4 28.3
Slovak Rep. 17.0 19.6
Bulgaria 29.2 39.0
Romania 29.5 27.7
EU-27 62.0 59.0 58.4 56.7 49.5 45.5 43.0
Notes: 1979 – EU9 = 9 member-states: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland.
1984 – EU10 – 9 member-states + Greece in 1981.
1989 – EU12 – 10 member-states + Spain and Portugal in 1986.
1994 – EU12 – 12 member-states.
1999 – EU15 – 12 member-states + Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995.
2004 – EU25 – 15 member-states + Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovak, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus and Malta in 2004.
2009 – EU27 – 25 member-states + Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
Source: European Parliament. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009).html (accessed 30 August 2013).
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and coding information of employed variables
Obs. Mean
Std
dev. Min. Max.
Cronbach’s
Alpha Description. Coding/recoding
Vote European
Parliament
1036 .47 .50 0 1 Voted yes/not. Missing excluded
Vote previous
national elections
980 1.80 .40 1 2 Voted not/yes. Missing excluded
National government
evaluation
1036 4.03 2.02 0 10 .70 0–10 scale obtained combining evaluation on: national economy, personal
job, household financial, national employment evaluation. Missing replaced
with mean and coded as intermediate cat.
European factor 1036 6.65 2.43 0 10 .87 0–10 scale obtained combining European support, benefit from EU
membership, European institutional trust, European identity, image of
Europe, support for E-policy making scale, European parliamentary
member important. Missing replaced with mean and coded as intermediate
cat.
Political involvement
factor
1036 2.23 1.62 0 5 .50 0–5 scale obtained combining strength of party identification and interest in
politics
Trust national
institutions
980 1.51 1.91 0 5 .86 0–5 scale obtained combining trust in national parliament, national
government, parties, justice. Missing replaced with mean and coded as
intermediate cat.
Political ideology 1036 1.62 .90 1 2 Left-right scale recoded as: 4-5-6-7 as 2 (centrism) other as 1. Missing
coded as 1
Education 1001 4.93 3.03 0 10 Age when stopped education
Urban residence 1036 1.84 .37 1 2 1 Rural; 2 Urban
Gender 1036 1.44 .50 1 2 1 Female; 2 Male
Age 1036 45.79 16.67 15 92 Age exact
Social status 991 5.65 1.46 1 10 Level in society self-placement. 1 Lower level – 10 higher level
Notes: All variables are coded from minimum to maximum value.
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